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Case Note
BANKRUPTCY LAW—A Battle of Two Acts:
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017)
Erin Berry *
I. Introduction
Under Roman law, a debtor’s body could be carved up and distributed to his
creditors in proportion to the debt owed to each creditor.1 The first bankruptcy
laws of England, passed in 1542, treated debtors as quasi-criminals and favored
imprisonment for lack of payment.2 Only creditors could commence a bankruptcy
proceeding based on conduct that indicated a debtor was attempting to prevent
creditors from receiving payment on debts owed.3 Early English bankruptcy
laws first introduced discharge to cooperative debtors in 1705.4 Discharge, or
release of the debtor from personal liability for pre-bankruptcy debts,5 was the
first progression toward debtor protection in bankruptcy. However, early English
bankruptcy remained focused on assisting creditors in the collection of debts.6
The first bankruptcy laws in the United States mirrored those of England and
retained a similar pro-creditor orientation.7 However, over time, bankruptcy law
in the United States morphed into a collective process geared towards protecting
debtors.8 Additionally, Congress acted to protect consumer rights by enacting
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) of 1977.9
Consumer bankruptcies remain prevalent in the United States notwithstanding the FDCPA’s protections. In 2016 alone, 793,932 debtors filed for
bankruptcy in courts around the United States.10 While both the Bankruptcy
* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2018. Thanks to Professor
Mark Glover for his insightful feedback and suggestions and the Editorial Board of the Wyoming
Law Review for their hard work, patience, and guidance while writing this note. Finally, special
thanks to my husband, whose endless encouragement and support made this possible.
Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 5, 7 (1995).
1

2

Id. at 7– 8.

3

Id. at 8.

4

Id. at 7–10.

5

Discharge in Bankruptcy, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

6

Tabb, supra note 1, at 10 –11.

7

Id. at 7.

8

See Tabb, supra note 1.

9

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).

June 2016 Bankruptcy Filings Down 6.9 Percent, United States Courts (July 27, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/07/27/june-2016-bankruptcy-filings-down-69-percent.
10

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2018

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 18 [2018], No. 1, Art. 6

238

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 18

Code and the FDCPA have elements of consumer protection, courts continually
struggle to determine how the two laws interact.11 Midland Funding, LLC v.
Johnson illustrates this struggle.12 In Midland Funding, the United States Supreme
Court held that a debt collector who files a time-barred proof of claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding does not violate the FDCPA.13 The majority found
that the broad definition of a “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code included even
unenforceable claims, and therefore filing a time-barred claim is not unfair,
unconscionable, deceptive, or misleading.14 Although the Court mistakenly
concluded that filing a time-barred proof of claim is not a deceptive practice
under the FDCPA, it correctly held that Midland had not violated the
FDCPA.15 Contrary to the Court’s reasoning, Midland’s time-barred proof of
claim did not violate the FDCPA because the Bankruptcy Code precludes the
FDCPA when a creditor files a proof of claim in bankruptcy. Thus, the result in
Midland Funding was correct, but the analysis was not.
This note first provides background information on the FDCPA and the
Bankruptcy Code.16 It then summarizes the circuit split over whether filing a
time-barred proof of claim violates the FDCPA prior to the decision in Midland
Funding.17 Part III describes the principal case, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson.18
Finally, this note explains why the Court’s analysis of the FDCPA in bankruptcy proceedings is flawed even though it correctly held that Midland had not
violated the FDCPA.19

II. Background
A. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
United States consumers have over $12 trillion in outstanding debt.20
Typically, when creditors are unsuccessful in collecting a debt, they will sell the

11
See, e.g., Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); In re
Claudio, 463 B.R. 190, 194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); In re McMillen, 440 B.R. 907, 913 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2010).
12

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).

13

Id. at 1415–16.

14

Id. at 1412.

15

Id. at 1415–16.

16

See infra notes 20–67 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 68 –100 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 101– 40 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 141–207 and accompanying text.

Josh Adams, The Role of Third-Party Debt Collection in the U.S. Economy, ACA Inter
2 (Jan. 2016), https://www.acainternational.org/assets/research-statistics/aca-wp-role3rd
party.pdf.
20

national
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debt for much less than it is worth to a debt collection company.21 This process
has created a massive debt collection industry in the United States, in which
third-party debt collection agencies recovered over $55 billion from consumers in
2013 alone.22 In contrast to creditors who typically use less force when
attempting to collect debts to preserve customer relationships, third-party debt
collectors have no such incentive to preserve goodwill.23 Prior to the FDCPA,
a third-party debt collection agency could use any means necessary to attempt
to collect on a debt.24 These practices included telephone calls at unreasonable
hours, misrepresentation of consumers’ rights, disclosing consumers’ financial
information to employers, and impersonating public officials and attorneys.25
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 with the intent to “eliminate abusive
debt collection practices by debt collectors.”26 Congress found that abusive debt
collection practices and inadequate laws to protect consumers contributed to “the
number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and
to invasions of individual privacy.”27 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from
using abusive, unfair, or deceptive practices in connection with the collection
of a debt.28 The FDCPA covers personal, family, and household debts and
establishes legal protection from abusive debt collection practices.29 Additionally,
the FDCPA governs debt collection businesses, affords consumers rights in debt
collection practices, and provides penalties and remedies for violations of the
Act.30 Due to the FDCPA, third-party debt collectors can no longer engage in
the abusive practices outlined above.31 Further, the Act imposes strict liability for
any violation.32 A debtor can recover statutory damages for violations even if the
debtor suffers no actual damages.33

21
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 –17 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
22

Adams, supra note 20, at 2.

23

S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1–2 (1977).

24

Id. at 2 –3.

25

Id. at 4.

26

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).

27

Id. § 1692.

28

Id. § 1692e–f.

29

Id.

30

Id. § 1692a(6), k.

31

Id. § 1692a–k.

32

Id. § 1692k(a).

Id. (providing actual damages, attorney’s fees, and up to $1000 as additional damages at the
court’s discretion for failing to comply with the FDCPA).
33
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The FDCPA does not apply broadly to creditors; rather, the Act applies
only to those who meet the definition of debt collectors.34 A debt collector is
defined by the FDCPA as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”35 The
term “debt collector” includes “any creditor who, in the process of collecting
his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a
third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.”36 The broad
definition of debt collectors includes third-party industries whose sole business
is to purchase stale debts from creditors at a steep discount in attempts to
collect.37 Additionally, the definition of debt collectors includes any business that
regularly attempts to collect on debts.38 This broad definition also includes those
businesses that are not typically thought of as creditors but regularly attempt to
collect debts owed, such as attorneys.39
Under the FDCPA, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.”40 Additionally, “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”41 To determine whether a debt
collector is using false, deceptive, or misleading means to collect a debt, courts
consider the “legal sophistication of the audience.”42 This is not a subjective
inquiry as to whether the particular plaintiff would have been misled.43 Instead,
the inquiry is whether the least sophisticated consumer would have been
deceived by the debt collector’s conduct.44 The standard intends to protect naïve
consumers in accordance with the legislative intent behind the FDCPA.45

34

Id. § 1692a(6).

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

See id.

38

Id.

See, e.g., Goins v. JBC & Assocs., P.C., 352 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268 (D.C. Conn. 2005)
(holding that an attorney was a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA when he was
involved in the collection of consumer debts and had control over debt collection letters).
39

40

15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

41

Id. § 1692f.

42

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383, n.37 (1977).

Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1177 n.11 (11th
Cir. 2014)).
43

44

Id.

45

Id. at 1259.
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B. The Bankruptcy Code and Its Definition of a Claim
Congress first exercised its constitutional authority to establish laws on
bankruptcy in 1898,46 when it enacted the Bankruptcy Act.47 Congress repealed
the 1898 Act when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which aimed to
make bankruptcy more efficient while balancing the interests of debtors and
creditors.48 Despite bankruptcy’s transformations in the United States, it has
been clear that one of the primary purposes of bankruptcy law is to “relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh.”49 Bankruptcy allows a debtor to surrender property for
distribution to creditors in exchange for discharge of debt.50 Commonly referred
to as the debtor’s “fresh start,” the discharge of debt allows a debtor to start over,
debt free.51
While the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is not to protect consumers, it
does afford protections to consumers during bankruptcy.52 A primary protection
of the Bankruptcy Code is the automatic stay, which acts as an instant freeze
on any attempts to collect a debt from a debtor in bankruptcy.53 Debtors may
enter into bankruptcy for “breathing room,” and the automatic stay immediately
halts all collection efforts to allow the debtor time to determine debts owed and
property owned that the debtor can forfeit for distribution to creditors.54 The
Bankruptcy Code provides for “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages,” giving
debtors a remedy for violations of the automatic stay.55
Commencing a bankruptcy case automatically creates an estate comprised of
all property in which the debtor has a legal or equitable interest.56 In a Chapter

46

U.S. Const. art. I § 8.

47

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).

U.S Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO/GGD-83-54, Bankruptcy Act
Before and After Look (1983), http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/140407.pdf.
48

of

1978—A

49
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 544 –555 (1915)).
50

Id.

51

See id. at 245.

52

E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).

53

Id.

54

In re Dennen, 539 B.R. 182, 187 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015).

55

11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).

56

Id. § 541.
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7 bankruptcy, a trustee57 liquidates all of the debtor’s nonexempt assets from
the estate and distributes payments from the proceeds of the liquidation to
creditors.58 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, after the estate is created, a consumer
debtor with regular income is permitted to retain his or her assets over the course
of a repayment plan period.59
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, he or she must file a list of creditors
with the bankruptcy court, which notifies the creditors of the bankruptcy.60
Upon notification that a bankruptcy has been filed in which a creditor has an
interest, a creditor must file a proof of claim form to recover from the bankruptcy
estate.61 This proof of claim indicates the interest that the creditor has in
repayment.62 A proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of validity of a
creditor’s claim, which shifts the burden to the debtor or trustee to object to
a filed proof of claim.63 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “claim” is a “right to
payment.”64 State law determines whether a person has a right to payment and is
also determinative of the statute of limitations on a debt.65 Statutes of limitations
set time limits on when a creditor can collect on a debt and, if a debt exceeds
the state’s statute of limitations on collection, that debt is considered timebarred.66 Upon objection to a proof of claim, the bankruptcy court may impose
sanctions against parties who file frivolous or bad faith proof of claims.67

C. Circuit Split Prior to Midland Funding
Prior to Midland Funding, circuits disagreed as to whether filing a timebarred proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding violates the FDCPA.68 The

57
A trustee in bankruptcy is a person appointed by United States Trustee Program who
manages and oversees the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. §§ 323, 704, 1302. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the trustee gathers the debtor’s non-exempt property, liquidates the property, and then distributes
the balance to creditors. Id. § 704. In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the trustee oversees the debtor’s
monthly payments and distributes the funds to the creditors. Id. § 1302.
58

Id. § 704.

59

Id. § 1306(b).

60

Id. § 521(a)(1).

61

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f ), 3002(a).

62

11 U.S.C. § 502.

63

See id. § 502(a).

64

Id. § 101(5)(A).

65

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–51 (2007).

66

See Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017).

67

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011.

Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding the
FDCPA applicable); see also In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016); Owens v. LVNV
Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2016); Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,
828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016).
68
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Eleventh Circuit held in a 2008 decision that knowingly filing a time-barred
proof of claim violates the FDCPA.69 The court determined that, when
assessing whether a debt collector has violated the FDCPA by using misleading
conduct, the least-sophisticated consumer standard70 applies.71 The inquiry is
whether the least sophisticated consumer would have been deceived by the debt
collector’s conduct.72 The court found that “a debt collector’s filing of a timebarred proof of claim creates the misleading impression to the debtor that the
debt collector can legally enforce the debt.”73 The Crawford court concluded that
this misleading impression under the least sophisticated consumer standard was a
violation of the FDCPA.74
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have reached contrary
results, holding that filing a time-barred proof of claim form is not a violation of
the FDCPA.75 In Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, the court held that filing
even an invalid proof of claim in bankruptcy does not constitute misleading
or abusive debt collection practices proscribed by the FDCPA.76 The Second
Circuit reasoned that the FDCPA is designed to protect against abusive debt
collection practices likely to disrupt a debtor’s life.77 In contrast, debtors in
bankruptcy do not need protection from abusive collection practices because
bankruptcy is a court-controlled process in which debtors are protected by
the court.78 Additionally, the Simmons court found that the Bankruptcy Code
provides remedies for wrongfully filed proofs of claim and nothing in either the
Bankruptcy Code or the FDCPA indicates “[c]ongress intended to allow debtors
to bypass the Code’s remedial scheme when it enacted the FDCPA.”79 Though the
court did not determine whether the FDCPA is ever applicable in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the court concluded that filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy
proceeding cannot form the basis for an FDCPA claim.80
69

Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014).

70

See supra notes 42– 45 and accompanying text.

71

Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 1261.

74

Id.

Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Dubois, 834
F.3d 522, 532 (4th Cir. 2016); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2016);
Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016).
75

76

Simmons, 622 F.3d at 95–96.

77

Id. at 96 (citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1997)).

78

Id.

79

Id. (citing Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Id. at n.2 (“Some courts have ruled more broadly that no FDCPA action can be based on
an act that violates any provision of the Bankruptcy Code, because such violations are dealt with
exclusively by the Bankruptcy Code. This broader rule has not been universally accepted, and we
are not compelled to consider it in this case.” (internal citations omitted)).
80
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Crawford holding in
In re Dubois.81 In In re Dubois, the court held that while filing a proof of claim
is a debt collection activity regulated by the FDCPA, a time-barred claim is still
a claim within the meaning of the term as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.82
Though the claim is not enforceable, the Bankruptcy Code does not speak to
whether an unenforceable claim can be filed.83 Rather, the Bankruptcy Code
provides for time-barred claims to be disallowed upon objection to the proof
of claim by an interested party.84 The court also noted that, though harm can
be caused by time-barred proof of claims that go unnoticed in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the consumer does not feel harm.85 A Chapter 13 debtor pays
the same amount into their bankruptcy plan regardless of the number of
unsecured claims that are filed.86 Thus, other unsecured creditors feel the harm
by receiving a smaller share of available funds.87 The court rationalized that the
reasons why it is “unfair” or “misleading” for a creditor to sue on a time-barred
debt are diminished in the bankruptcy context, where the debtor has other
protections and benefits from having debts reconciled in a court regulated
process.88 The court concluded that filing a time-barred proof of claim in
bankruptcy does not violate the FDCPA, but did not go so far as to articulate that
the FDCPA is inapplicable in a bankruptcy context.89
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals similarly addressed the issue in Owens
v. LVNV Funding, LLC.90 The court held that a claim is a right to payment and,
under state law, the expiration of the statute of limitations does not extinguish
the underlying debt.91 A creditor with a debt that is subject to a statute of
limitations defense retains a right to payment, “even if the recourse is only
grounded in the debtor’s moral obligation to pay.”92 The court held that because
the Bankruptcy Code has a procedure for disallowing time-barred proof of
claims, the Bankruptcy Code “contemplates that creditors will file proofs of
claim for unenforceable debts—including stale debts—and that the bankruptcy

81

In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016).

82

Id. at 529–30.

83

Id. at 530.

84

Id. at 531.

85

Id. at 532.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 532–33.

89

Id. at 533.

90

Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2016).

91

Id. at 730– 31.

Id. at 731 (citing McMahon v. LVNV Funding, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“[S]ome people might consider full debt re-payment a moral obligation, even though the legal
remedy for the debt has been extinguished”)).
92
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court will disallow those claims upon the debtor’s objection.”93 Additionally, the
court cited Supreme Court decisions recognizing that Congress intended for the
term “claim” to have the “broadest possible definition.”94 Similar to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
concerns of misleading a consumer are diminished in bankruptcy proceedings
where attorneys typically represent debtors.95 Analogous to other Circuit Courts
that have addressed this issue, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
filing a time-barred proof of claim is not a violation of the FDCPA, but failed
to address whether the FDCPA is applicable at all in a bankruptcy proceeding.96
Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected Crawford in Nelson
v. Midland Credit Mgmt.97 In a short opinion, the court found that Crawford
“ignores the differences between a bankruptcy claim and actual or threatened
litigation.”98 Unlike debtors in civil actions, debtors in bankruptcy are protected
by trustees with fiduciary duties to both the debtor and other creditors to object
to unenforceable claims.99 The court concluded that “there is no need to protect
debtors who are already under the protection of the bankruptcy court, and there
is no need to supplement the remedies afforded by bankruptcy itself.”100

III. Principal Case
Prior to the Supreme Court addressing the issue of whether filing a
time-barred proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding violates the FDCPA,
the Eleventh Circuit remained the only circuit to have concluded that such
actions were a violation of the FDCPA.101 To resolve the split, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson.102
In March 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of Alabama.103 Two months later, Midland Funding, LLC, one of the nation’s
93

Id. at 732.

Id. at 733 (citing Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 522, 563– 64
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537
U.S. 293, 302 (2003); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469
U.S. 274, 279 (1985).
94

95

Owens, 832 F.3d at 736.

96

Id. at 737.

97

Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016).

98

Id.

99
100

Id.
Id. (citing Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010)).

101

Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).

102

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).

103

Id. at 1411.
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largest buyers of unpaid debt, filed a proof of claim asserting that Johnson owed
Midland $1,879.71 on a credit-card debt.104 The last charge that appeared
on the account that Midland filed the proof of claim for was in May of 2003,
10 years prior to Johnson’s bankruptcy filing.105 Alabama has a six-year statute
of limitation on actions to recover money lent by a creditor.106 Johnson objected
to the claim in the bankruptcy forum because it was time-barred, and the
Bankruptcy Court disallowed the claim.107
Johnson then filed the instant action against Midland for a violation of the
FDCPA.108 The District Court decided that the FDCPA did not apply, holding
that an irreconcilable conflict existed between the Bankruptcy Code and the
FDCPA such that the Bankruptcy Code precluded the FDCPA.109 The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Code
does not preclude the FDCPA, and a creditor who files a time-barred proof
of claim violates the FDCPA.110 The United States Supreme Court granted
Midland’s petition for a writ of certiorari, noting the split in circuits concerning
whether filing a time-barred proof of claim in bankruptcy is false, deceptive,
misleading, unconscionable, or unfair within the meaning of the FDCPA. 111
First, the majority found that it was “reasonably clear” that Midland’s proof
of claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.”112 Under the Bankruptcy Code,
a “claim” is a “right to payment,” and state law determines whether someone has
a right to payment.113 The Court held that under Alabama state law, a right to
payment continues after the limitations period has expired.114 Johnson argued
that a “claim,” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, means only an enforceable
claim.115 The Court did not find this argument persuasive, noting that the word
“enforceable” does not appear within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a claim,
nor does the interpretation comply with other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.116 In determining whether a statement is misleading, courts take the
104
Id.; Frequently Asked Questions, Midland Funding, https://www.midlandfunding.com/
faqs/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
105

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.

106

Ala. Code § 6-2-34 (2014); Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.

107

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.

108

Id.

109

Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 473 (S.D. Ala. 2015).

110

Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016).

111

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411–12.

112

Id. at 1411.

113

Id. at 1411; 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012).

114

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.

115

Id. at 1412.

116

Id.
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legal sophistication of the audience into consideration.117 The Court determined
that the trustee in bankruptcy, who examines the proof of claim forms,
is the audience and has the sophistication to determine that a proof of claim
is subject to disallowance.118 Therefore, filing a time-barred proof of claim is
not misleading.119
Next, the majority held that an obviously time-barred proof of claim is not
unfair or unconscionable within the meaning of the FDCPA.120 Though many
courts have held in ordinary civil actions that a debt collector’s assertion of a
time-barred claim is unfair, the Court found this standard inapplicable in the
bankruptcy setting.121 The Court again relied on the difference between the
unsophisticated consumer in ordinary civil suits and the knowledgeable trustee
in a bankruptcy proceeding.122 The Court suggested that consumers who
initiate bankruptcy proceedings are more knowledgeable and less likely to pay
a stale claim.123 Johnson argued that there was not ““a single legitimate reason”
for allowing this kind of behavior,” thus it must be unfair to allow a debt collector to buy stale claims, assert them in bankruptcy, and hope the trustee doesn’t
catch the statute of limitations defense.124 The Court was not persuaded by this
argument, noting that timeliness is an affirmative defense in bankruptcy and
it is the duty of the trustee to investigate claims and determine if the claims are
stale.125 The Court also held that Congress did not intend for the FDCPA to
“determine answers to these bankruptcy-related questions.”126 Rather, the FDCPA
and the Bankruptcy Code were intended to have two distinct purposes.127 The
Court concluded that holding the FDCPA applicable to time-barred proof of
claim forms filed in bankruptcy proceedings would “upset [the] ‘delicate balance’”
between debtors’ protections and obligations that the Bankruptcy Code seeks
to maintain.128
Writing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan, argued that allowing debt collectors to buy stale debts, “fil[e]
claims in bankruptcy proceedings to collect it, and hop[e] that no one notices
117

Id. at 1413.
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Id.
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Id. at 1411–13.
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Id. at 1414 –15.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1413.
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Id. at 1414.
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Id.

126

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1415.
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that the debt is too old to be enforced,” is both unfair and unconscionable.129
Justice Sotomayor noted that the Nation’s debt collection agencies earned over
$13 billion in revenue last year on debts that they purchased for pennies on the
dollar.130 The dissent argued that, because the FDCPA has largely blocked debt
collectors from attempting to collect stale debts in state courts, debt collectors
have turned to the bankruptcy forum to attempt to continue their practice of
collecting stale, time-barred debts.131 The very company in this suit, Midland
Funding, entered into a consent decree with the government in 2015 prohibiting
it from filing civil actions to collect time-barred debts and ordering it to pay
$34 million in restitution.132 The dissent noted the similarities between a civil
action to recover a time-barred debt (which every court to consider the matter
has held to be a violation of the FDCPA) and an attempt to recover the debt
in a bankruptcy proceeding.133 In both situations, the statute of limitations is
an affirmative defense to be raised either by the debtor or the trustee.134 In both
situations, debt collectors file claims and “hope that no one notices that they
are too old to be enforced.”135 The dissent noted that the distinctions that the
majority made between bankruptcy and civil actions bear no weight.136 The
structural features of a bankruptcy process do not reduce the risk of a stale debt
going unnoticed because trustees “cannot realistically be expected to identify every
time-barred . . . claim filed in every bankruptcy.”137 A consumer who files
for bankruptcy is not more sophisticated than the average consumer debtor
because “after all, [he] has just declared that he is unable to meet his financial
obligations.”138 Finally, consumers do not benefit from a time-barred proof of
claim being filed because many debtors do not end up fully paying off their
debts in Chapter 13 proceedings.139 The dissent concluded that “[i]t takes only
the common sense to conclude that one should not be able to profit on the
inadvertent inattention of others” and requested Congress amend the FDCPA to
explicitly prohibit debt collectors from engaging in this form of conduct.140

129

Id. at 1416 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Id. (citing Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Annual
Report 8 (2016)).
130

131

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Id.; see Consent Order in In re Encore Capital Group, Inc., 2015-CFPB-0022 38, 46 (Sept.
9, 2015).
132

133

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

134

Id.

135

Id. at 1418.
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Id. at 1420.

Id. (citing Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 25–26, Midland Funding, LLC v.
Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348)).
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Id. at 1420.
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Id. at 1421.
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IV. Analysis
The Court in Midland Funding reached the correct result; however, its
reasoning is incorrect. The majority’s analysis missed the mark because it
truncated an important issue: whether the FDCPA is precluded by the Bankruptcy
Code in the context of filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. The
FDCPA seeks to prevent bankruptcies, rather than to protect debtors who have
already entered bankruptcy.141 The protections afforded by the FDCPA are
directed at consumers in a non-bankruptcy proceeding and are inapplicable in the
court controlled context of a bankruptcy proceeding.142 Additionally, consumers
do not feel the harm of an allowed time-barred proof of claim, further evidencing
the inapplicability of the FDCPA in the proof of claim context.143 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, a creditor cannot simultaneously comply with the
FDCPA while engaging in a right that the Bankruptcy Code provides for—filing
a time-barred proof of claim.144 This irreconcilable conflict results in the Bank
ruptcy Code precluding the FDCPA in the proof of claim context. Rather than
analyzing whether a time-barred proof of claim is false, deceptive, or misleading
under the FDCPA, the Court should have analyzed whether the FDCPA
applies at all to a time-barred proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Notably, the majority referenced the above analysis in its decision in Midland
Funding.145 The majority discussed the protections offered by the Bankruptcy
Code and the diminished risk of harm to consumers in a bankruptcy proceeding.146
The majority stated:
The Act and the Code have different purposes and structural
features. The Act seeks to help consumers, not necessarily by
closing what Johnson and the United States characterize as a
loophole in the Bankruptcy Code, but by preventing consumer
bankruptcies in the first place. The Bankruptcy Code, by way
of contrast, creates and maintains what we have called ‘the
delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations.’147
While the majority alluded to the inapplicability of the FDCPA, the majority
did not decide whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes the FDCPA in this
context. This analysis is essential to a full understanding of Midland Funding.

141

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012).

142

See infra notes 166 –73 and accompanying text.

143

See infra notes 174– 86 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 186 –207 and accompanying text.
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Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1415.
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Id. at 1413–14.
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Id. at 1414.
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A. Filing a Time-Barred Proof of Claim is Misleading within the Definition
of the FDCPA
In finding that filing a time-barred proof of claim form is not “false, deceptive,
or misleading,” as proscribed by the FDCPA, the Supreme Court looked to the
legal sophistication of its audience.148 However, the Court incorrectly concluded
that the audience in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is the trustee.149 The Court
found that in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the audience includes a trustee, who is
knowledgeable about the process and is trained to spot time-barred claims which
can be defeated by the statute of limitations affirmative defense.150 The Court
failed to acknowledge that the majority of federal circuits have employed some
form of the “least sophisticated consumer” standard when determining whether
a creditor’s conduct is false, deceptive, or misleading.151 This standard should
not change because there is an additional member of the audience, the trustee,
in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee is not the only person who can object
to a proof of claim; any party in interest can object to a proof of claim filed in
bankruptcy.152 Congress determined that the term “a party in interest” was to
be defined by case law.153 Courts have found that the term “party in interest”
includes the debtor and other creditors.154 Other creditors, and certainly the
debtor, could be members of the public with no legal experience.155 The majority
suggested that a debtor who files for bankruptcy is more knowledgeable than the
average consumer.156 The dissent quickly rebutted this notion: “A person who
has filed for bankruptcy will rarely be in such a superior position; he has, after
all, just declared that he is unable to meet his financial obligations and in need of
the assistance of the courts.”157 Courts have determined that Congress intended
courts to view FDCPA claims “from the perspective of the least sophisticated

148

Id. at 1413.

149

Id.

150

Id.

See, e.g., Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding, 766 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2014);
McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2012); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 645– 46 (7th Cir. 2009); Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d
316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004); Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Nat’l Fin. Serv., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1996); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318
(2d Cir. 1993); Smith v. Transworld Sys., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028–30 (6th Cir. 1992); Jeter v. Credit
Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985).
151
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11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
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S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 62 (1978).
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11 U.S.C. § 502; In re Sims, 278 B.R. 457, 484 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2002).
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See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1420–22 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1413 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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debtor.”158 Through filing a time-barred proof of claim form, creditors deceive
debtors and bankruptcy courts. Such an action is false, deceptive, or misleading,
as contemplated by the FDCPA.
Further, as noted by the dissent in Midland Funding, the trustee in a
bankruptcy proceeding does not create the level of protection suggested by the
majority.159 The United States Government stated in its Amicus Curiae Brief
that trustees “cannot realistically be expected to identify every time-barred . . .
claim filed in every bankruptcy.”160 In some districts, due to the large-scale
submission of claims, trustees typically only object to claims filed after the
claims bar date or to claims seeking priority treatment.161
Additionally, every court that has considered this question in the context
of a civil suit has found that a debt collector who knowingly files suit to collect
a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA.162 The Court in Midland Funding
distinguished civil actions from bankruptcy proceedings due to the possibility
that unsophisticated consumers would not be aware of the statute of limitations
and may pay a stale debt to avoid the cost and embarrassment of a lawsuit.163
However, as noted by the dissent, the distinguishing factors relied on by the
majority are not significant.164 The dissent noted that “[i]t does not take a
sophisticated attorney to understand why the practice . . . is unfair.”165 The actions
of debt collectors in attempting to deceive the bankruptcy court and the trustee
are false, deceptive, misleading, and unfair as completed by the FDCPA.

B. Though This Conduct is Misleading, the FDCPA Does not Apply
in Bankruptcy
Regardless of the Court’s incorrect determination that filing a time-barred
claim is not a deceptive practice, the Court reached the correct conclusion because
the FDCPA does not apply to filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.

158

E.g., Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 420 (3d Cir. 2015).

159

See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25–26, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson,
137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348).
160

161

Id. at 26.

162

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

163

Id. at 1413 (majority opinion).

164

Id. at 1420–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 129–40 and accompanying text.

165

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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1. FDCPA Protections are Directed at Consumers
“The FDCPA is a consumer protection statute that prohibits certain abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.”166 The statutory provisions
of the FDCPA in addition to the legislative history make it clear that Congress
intended the FDCPA to prohibit actions that “burden or injure consumers.”167
The FDCPA begins with congressional findings and a declaration of
purpose.168 Congress found that the “existing laws and procedures” for redressing
injuries caused by “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” were
“inadequate to protect consumers.”169 Congress passed the FDCPA with the goal
of “eliminat[ing] abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, insur[ing]
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and promot[ing] consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”170 The intent
of the FDCPA to protect consumers is also evident in the legislative history of
the FDCPA: “The Act’s purpose is to protect consumers from a host of unfair,
harassing, and deceptive, debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary
restrictions on ethical debt collectors.”171
Further, FDCPA prohibitions and protections only apply to attempts to
collect consumer debts. The FDCPA prohibits making a “false, deceptive,
or misleading representation” or using “unfair or unconscionable means” in
connection with the collection of the debt.172 “Debt” is narrowly defined by the
FDCPA as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money
arising out of a transaction in which the [goods or services] which are the subject
of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”173
The definitions within the FDCPA indicate that the purpose of the Act is only
to protect actions against consumers.

2. Consumers Do not Feel the Harm of Time-Barred Proofs of Claim
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in non-exempt property as of the

166

Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 n.1 (2013).

Brief for Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4,
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348).
167

168

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).

169

Id. § 1692(a)–(b) (emphasis added).

170

Id. § 1692(e) (emphasis added).

171

S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1 (1977) (emphasis added).

172

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)–(f ).

173

Id. § 1692(a)(5).
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date of the commencement of the case.174 The newly created bankruptcy estate
is a legal entity separate and distinct from the debtor.175 A trustee administers
the bankruptcy estate and oversees the process of collecting the debtor’s assets,
liquidating those assets, and distributing the proceeds to creditors with allowed
claims.176 The distinction between the debtor and the bankruptcy estate is also
evident in the provisions of the automatic stay. Filing a bankruptcy petition
automatically precludes creditors from commencing or continuing attempts to
collect pre-petition debts from the debtor.177 However, the automatic stay does not
prevent creditors from attempting to collect from the bankruptcy estate.178 The
proof of claim process permits creditors to attempt to collect from the bankruptcy
estate, and the notion that filing a proof of claim violates the automatic stay
is “absurd.”179
When a creditor files a proof of claim in bankruptcy, that claim is against
the bankruptcy estate, not the debtor.180 The trustee’s allowance of a claim does
not affect the debtor or the debtor’s assets; allowance of a claim only affects how
the assets in the estate will be divided among the creditors.181 In a Chapter 7
case, the estate is comprised of all nonexempt property in which the debtor has
a legal or equitable interest.182 The trustee liquidates the property in the estate,
and the proceeds from the liquidation are distributed to creditors.183 The debtor
surrenders all nonexempt property to the estate to be distributed to creditors
regardless of the amount of claims filed by creditors.184 Similarly, in a Chapter 13
case, the debtor proposes a plan to pay creditors with future income and retains
pre-bankruptcy assets.185 The bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 13 case is comprised
of the debtor’s legal and equitable interests as of the commencement of the case
and also future earnings from the time the case is commenced until the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to another chapter.186 The claim allowance process
serves not to protect debtors; rather, this process serves the purpose of ensuring
fairness amongst creditors.
174

11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).

175

United States v. Mitchell, 476 F.3d 539, 544 (8th Cir. 2007).

176

11 U.S.C. §§ 321–323, 701–705, 1302.
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11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

178

In re Layne, No. 98-13017, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2030 at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
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11 U.S.C. § 501; In re Layne, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2030 at *7.
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Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 449 (2007).

181

In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 532 (4th Cir. 2016).

182

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
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Id. § 726.

See Brief for Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
11–16, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348).
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3. Applying the FDCPA in Bankruptcy Upsets the “Delicate Balance”—
the Bankruptcy Code Precludes the FDCPA
While the majority acknowledged that application of the FDCPA in a
bankruptcy proceeding would upset the “delicate balance” between the two acts,
the court did not determine whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between
the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code.187 However, to determine whether
the Bankruptcy Code precludes the FDCPA in the proof of claim context, an
analysis of this conflict is essential. Determining whether the Bankruptcy Code
precludes the FDCPA completes a full analysis of Midland Funding.
To determine whether one federal statute precludes or impliedly repeals
another federal statute, “the legislature’s demonstration of intent” is key.188
Courts may not reach the conclusion that two statutes conflict lightly and,
if an interpretation permits both statutes to stand, a court must adopt that
interpretation.189 However, “[c]ongress’s intent to effect an implied repeal can be
inferred when a later statute conflicts with or is repugnant to an earlier-enacted
statute.”190 In the case of the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he proper
inquiry . . . is whether the FDCPA claim raises a direct conflict between the Code
or Rules and the FDCPA, or whether both can be enforced.”191
As found by the majority in Midland Funding, the Bankruptcy Code permits
filing of a time-barred proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.192 A creditor
may file a proof of claim, which constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of
the claim.193 A claim is “deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.”194
The Bankruptcy Code further provides for situations when a creditor files a
time-barred proof of claim form. Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that debtors or trustees can object to a proof of claim as unenforceable.195 The
bankruptcy court then determines whether the claim filed by the creditor is
valid, and only valid claims are enforceable.196 In addition to the procedural
mechanisms provided by the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Code offers
remedies for wrongfully filed proof of claims.197 Not only does the Bankruptcy
187

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2017).

188

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 619 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010).

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2013).

192

Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411–12.

193

11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f ).
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11 U.S.C. § 502(a).

195

Id. § 502.
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Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(b)–(c).
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Code disallow unenforceable claims, a bankruptcy court also has the power
to issue sanctions for any representation to the court that is determined to have
been presented for an improper purpose.198
In contrast, the FDCPA proscribes a debt collector from filing a proof of
claim in bankruptcy that the debt collector knows to be time-barred.199 Thus, the
Bankruptcy Code permits an action by a creditor which the FDCPA prohibits,
creating an irreconcilable conflict between the two acts. The district court
in Midland Funding similarly concluded that an irreconcilable conflict exists
between an FDCPA claim based on a creditor’s proof of claim for a time-barred
debt and a creditor’s right to payment (which exists even after the statute of
limitations has expired) and entitlement to file a proof of claim for such right
to payment.200 The contradictory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the
FDCPA “cannot possibly be given effect simultaneously, the provisions are
positively repugnant and cannot mutually coexist.”201 A creditor cannot
simultaneously engage in an action that the Bankruptcy Code provides a right
in which to engage (filing a time-barred proof of claim) while complying with
the FDCPA. In the face of an irreconcilable conflict, the “later-enacted statute
controls.”202 The Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, is the later-enacted
statute, as Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977.203 The FDCPA “must
give way to the [Bankruptcy] Code only to the extent that the two statutes
irreconcilably conflict.”204
The irreconcilable conflict between the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code
results in the Bankruptcy Code controlling. The Bankruptcy Code provides for
situations in which a creditor files a time-barred proof of claim, and cannot form
the basis for FDCPA liability. “[A] mere browse through the complex, detailed,
and comprehensive provisions of the lengthy Bankruptcy Code . . . demonstrates
Congress’s intent to create a whole system under federal control which is
designed to bring together and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and
embarrassed debtors alike.”205 The Bankruptcy Code provides its own remedies
for situations in which a creditor files a time-barred proof of claim form through
disallowance of unenforceable claims and court ordered sanctions against a
creditor who makes a false representation to the court.206 Allowing a debtor to
198

Id. 9011(c).

199

See supra notes 148– 65 and accompanying text.

200

Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 473 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2016).
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Id. at 473.
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Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662–63 (2007).
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Midland Funding, 528 B.R. at 473.
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pursue “a simultaneous claim under the FDCPA would allow through the back
door what [a debtor] cannot accomplish through the front door—a private right
of action. This would circumvent the remedial scheme of the Code under which
Congress struck a balance between the interests of debtors and creditors.”207

V. Conclusion
The FDCPA was intended to prevent bankruptcy, not to regulate it.208 When a
creditor files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, the protections afforded
by the FDCPA are not applicable. Consumers, whom the FDCPA intends to
protect, do not feel the harm of a time-barred proof of claim.209 The legislative
intent behind the FDCPA is no longer applicable in light of the more recently
enacted Bankruptcy Code, and, further, the two acts create an irreconcilable
conflict. “[W]here the Code and Rules provide a remedy for acts taken in
violation of their terms, debtors may not resort to other state and federal remedies
to redress their claims lest the congressional scheme behind the bankruptcy
laws and their enforcement be frustrated.”210 Midland Funding presented the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to rule on this irreconcilable conflict;
however, the Court did not weigh in. Without guidance from the Supreme
Court on the interaction between the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code, courts
and practitioners alike are left with questions regarding how to simultaneously
comply with both acts. Until the Supreme Court expands on how to “delicately
balance” the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code, the question remains unanswered.
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